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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 43 (a)
THOMAS F. GREEN, JR.*

A

FREAK A-MONG THE RULES

Rule 43(a) is an anomaly in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
Attorney General Cummings, the chief sponsor of the enabling act,2 apparently did not contemplate the inclusion of any rule dealing with the
admissibility of evidence. 3 The American Bar Association, which sponsored
similar bills before Congress for years, laid much of the groundwork but
abandoned the project prior to successful completion. 4 A report of the
Association's committee charged with the duty of "pushing" the then current
version of the bill stated that the court rules were not to deal with evidence.5
The broadest expression in the bill which was enacted into law in 1934, as
well as in the bill upon which the Bar Association' committee reported, authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe "procedure" for the district courts.
The Supreme Court had previously indicated that procedure includes the
law of evidence.6 The Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme Court
to draft the Rules of Civil Procedure became convinced that the Court had
authority under the statute to deal with evidence and that it was necessary for
the Court to exercise the authority. Chairman Mitchell has said:
"When you are uniting actions at law and suits in equity, in matters of procedure,
into one form of action and one procedure, and the courts are expected to ignore the

question whether an action was originally one cognizable in law or in equity, you run
afoul of the question whether the rules of evidence to be followed are those theretofore
prevailing in actions at law or those prevailing in suits in equity. There are some
differences."'

Rule 43(a) was adopted to settle the question stated by Mr. Mitchell.
The first sentence of the Rule simply provides for testimony to be taken orally
*Professor of Law, University of Georgia; author, To What Extent May Courts
under the Rule-Aaking Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence? 26 A.B.A.J. 482 (1940)
(Ross Prize, 1940), The Admissibility of Evidence under the Federal Rulcs, 55 HARV. L.
REv. 197 (1941), and other articles.

1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. (1950); 1 F.R.D. LXXIV (1941).
2. Act of June 19, 1934, c.651, § 2, 48 STAT. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072

(Supp. 1951).
3. Cummings, Immediate Problems for the Bar, 20 A.B.A.J. 212 (1934).
4. 57 A.B.A. REP. 119 (1932).
5. Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A.J 509, 517,
519 (1920).
6. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 Sup. Ct. 922, 43 L. Ed. 204 (1898);

Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 231, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506 (1882). For a
general discussion see Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making
Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence? 26 A.B.A.J. 482 (1940).

7. PROCEEDiNGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 186 (1938). What
differences does Mr. Mitchell have in mind? One difference was that the federal courts
conformed, at least in some circuits, to evidence rules of the states in actions at law
but did not in equity. See note 12 infra.
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in open court as a general practice.

This was being done already in equity as

well as at law.8 The second sentence is as follows:
"All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United
States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United
States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held."'

No complete explanation of the choice of language has been given. Probably the federal sources were limited to statutes' and evidence law applied in

equity, because varying degrees of conformity to state law prevailed in actions
at law. In some circuits the courts of appeals required conformity to evidence law of the state in which the federal trial court was sitting ;10 'in others
conformity to state statute law alone was expected." On the equity side'of
the district court there vas no requirement of conformity. 12 Therefore tlie
reference to equity appears to have been used in Rule 43(a) to make clear
that existing federal precedents were to control admissibility if they would admit the data sought to be introduced. 13 The law of evidence for courts of
equity is in general the same as for courts of law. So far as the rules of admissibility are concerned, the main difference was in the less strict application in
equity. 14 Hence it is not surprising that the courts used decisions in actions
at law to determine the rules of evidence heretofore applied in equity.

5

.'

The treatment of evidence in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not
limited to a single provision but extends through 21 Rules. Of these, Rules
8. The equity practice was set forth in Equity Rule 46.
9. "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible
under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of
evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held. In any case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of
the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made. The competency of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner." FED.
R. Civ. P. 43(a).
10. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. Luray Supply Co., 6 F.2d 218 (4th Cir: 1925);
Pooler v. United States, 127 Fed. 519 (1st Cir. 1904) ; Stewart v. Morris, 88 -Fed. 461
(7th Cir. 1898); see Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Land, Mortgage &
Agency Co., 189 U.S. 221, 228, 23 Sup. Ct. 517, 47 L. Ed. 782 (1903).
11. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1930); West Tennessee Grain Co.. v.
J. C. Shaffer & Co., 299 Fed. 197 (6th Cir. 1924).
12. 1 WIG oRE, EvnsExcE § 4 (3d ed. 1940). An exception was competency -6f
witnesses. REv. STAT. § 858 (1878), as amended, 34, STAT. 618 (1906), repealed by 62
STAT. 992 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 39 (1949).
13. W. D. Mitchell in PROCEEDINGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES
186 (1938).
14. See W. F. & John Barnes Co. v. International Harvester Co., 145 F.2d 915,
917 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 850 (1945); 1 WIGmORE, EviDENCE. § 4
(3d ed. 1940).
15. Peoples Gas Co. v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1951); Reck v.
Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 180 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Vanadium Corp. of America
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 159 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Note, 46 COL.
L. REv. 267, 271 (1946).
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26 through 37 deal with depositions and discovery, including physical and
mental examination and request for admission of facts. The others and their
subject-matters are 43, admissibility, competency of witnesses, form and scope
of examination, record of excluded evidence, affirmation, and evidence on
motions; 44, proof of official records; 45, subpoena and service; 50, authorization to a party, who moves for a directed verdict at the close of his opponent's evidence, to introduce evidence in the event the motion is not
granted; 59(a), additional testimony on certain motions for new trial; 61,
harmless error; 68, evidence of an unaccepted offer of judgment, inadmissible;
80(c), proof of prior testimony by the transcript. Although the sponsors and
the Advisory Committee at first did not intend for evidence to be included, the
86 Rules finally issued deal with the subject in approximately one fourth of
their number. Of these the Rule with the broadest coverage is Number 43.
Subdivision (a) of Rule 43 is an anomaly for the additional reason that
it does not advance in its own field the purposes which the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were designed to serve. These are :'(
(1) The need to modernize federal procedure. The need was just as
great with regard to evidence law as it was in the area of pleading and
practice but was not met by the Rules. Some of the specific provisions are
commendable, such as those of Rule 44 which furnish a simple, cumulative
method of provIng official records or absence of record and those of 43(b)
providing for calling and examining the adverse party; but these have a
very limited scope; the great body of precepts on admissibility is left to two
sentences in Rule 43 (a). The language will be discussed below. Viewed as
a device for modernizing the federal law of evidence it is inadequate.
(2) A desire to make federal procedure more flexible and to place its
control in the hands of persons better qualified to deal with it than Congress.
The desideratum was to be obtained by replacing common law and statutes
with rules of court. This was accomplished in other areas but in the field of
evidence most of the principles are not set forth in the Rules; only a statement of where to find them is given. The common law and statutes as interpreted by the authorities designated in Rule 43(a) still prevail to the
extent indicated by the Rule. Although the law of evidence applied in the
courts of the states will include the limited number of court rules on evidence
which are in existence, they are of comparatively small importance.1 7 No
state has a complete set of rules of court for evidence.
(3) A wish to replace conformity to state procedure with uniformity
throughout the district courts so that the federal judiciary would have a
16. Mitchell, Attitude of Advisory Committee, 22 A.B.A.J. 780, 781 (1936); PRO-

CEEDINGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES

189 (1938).

17. Green, To What Extent May Courts under the Rude-Making Power Prescribe
Rudes of Evidence? 26 A.B.A.J. 482, 484 (1940).
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simple, modern, efficient system which would serve as a model for the state
courts. The hope was, and is, that the federal example would improve conditions in the state tribunals and that a lawyer would eventually be able to
follow practically the same procedure in both sets of courts.,' In the field of
evidence however no provision is made for uniform rules of admissibility.
No single system is established to influence reform in the states.
The failure to deal adequately in the Rules of Civil Procednie with the
law of evidence is not surprising. An attempt to do so would have doubled
the work of the Advisory Committee. Such an effort would have been at
least equal to the labor and difficulty involved in the rest of the Rules. The
drafting of a code of evidence rules has seldom been attempted. The few attempts have not been well received.' 9 The reform of pleading and practice
was the problem originally envisaged for the Federal Rules and its solution
was much more obvious. Possible controversies in Congress over the proper
treatment of the evidence problems might have held up the taking effect of
all the Rules. 20 There is less excuse for leaving the original solution unchanged for more than thirteen years.

RULE 43(A) AS AN INSTRUMENT OF

MODERNIZATION

The modern tendency is to admit any evidence throwing light on the
question but to give to the trial judge discretion as to the reasonable bounds
of the hearing. 2' This doctrine, unlike the modern principles of pleading,
has not been generally incorporated in state statutes and is not so widely
accepted. Where it is accepted the trend is toward less and less emphasis on
the opinion, hearsay and other exclusionary rules. 22 Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 43 (a) has certain inherent limitations which prevent it from contributing
strongly to the trend. The language of the Rule does not provide for specific
reforms but merely makes available such reforms as spring from other
origins. Because neither state nor federal law of admissibility has been
greatly influenced by the modern tendency of the more advanced rulings,
there will be many instances in which liberal precedents are either nonexistent
18. Clark, The Inflitence of FederalProcedural Reforns, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
144 (1948).
19. No state has adopted the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence. Falknor, Evidence in
1949 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 975 (N.Y.U. 1950).
20. Monte M. Lemann in

PROCEEDINGS OF ATLANTA INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES

72 (1938). The Rules were to be reported to Congress at the beginning of a regular
session and were not to take effect until the close of such session. Act of June 19, 1934,
c.651 § 2, 48 STAT. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (Supp. 1951).
21. United States v. 25A06 Acres of Land in Arlington County, Virginia, 172 F.2d
990 (4th Cir. 1949).
22. Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Zimberg v. United States,
142 F.2d 132, 135 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Boerner v. United States, 117 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir.
1941).
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or constitute a small minority. judges of the United States courts, like most
lawyers in this country, are precedent minded.2= They are inclined to say that
24
changes in. accepted precepts should be made by legislation.
The exceptions to the hearsay rule constitute one of the most unsatisfactory portions of our law. Their unreasonableness and inconsistency is generally recognized but almost nothing has been done in this country to reform
them.2 5 Although statutes disqualifying a surviving party to a transaction
as a witness in litigation with the successor to the deceased or incompetent
party to the transaction are universally condemned by modern writers," they
are in effect in all but a very few of the states.2 T Thus liberal precedents on
these points will be lacking in almost all of the states. The power of precedent was ignored by those who predicted that in general Rule 43(a) would
place admissibility upon the sole basis of relevancy and materiality 21 or would
give the federal courts freedom to develop their own rules. 20 These predictions
were based upon the assertion that few equity decisions pass upon evidence
qtiestions and that there is consequently no body of law dealing with admissibility in equity. As stated above the decided cases do not fulfill the predictions. 30 The courts have assumed that decisions in actions at law would
have been followed in equity. 3 1

Judge Clark, the draftsman of the Rules

of Civil Procedure, seems to make the same assumption. 32 Even if there
were no evidence decisions binding in equity causes in the district court the
judges would consider cases from other jurisdictions to be persuasive au23. Compare Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914), with Gadsden
v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 151 (D. Md. 1944), which, however, is not decided under
Rule 43 (a).
24. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1946).
25. Boerner v. United States, 117 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir. 1941); Morgan and
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. Rav. 909, 921
(1937) ; Morgan, Some Suggestions for Defining and Classifying Hearsay, 86 U. or PA.
L. REv. 258, 273 (1938).
26. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 1946) ; CIAFEE, MORGAN et a!.,
THE LAw OF EvIDENcE, SoME PROPOSALS FOR ITs RF-OR 27 (1927).
27. 2 WIGmORE, EVIDErcE § 578 n.1 (3d ed. 1940); VANDERBILT, MINIAUsM
STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTmATION 334 (1949) ; Rubin, Evidence in 1947 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AmERICAx LAw 1068, 1076 (N.Y.U.
28. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTicE 1313 (2d ed.

1948).
1951).

29. Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New FederalRudes of Civil Procedure:
2, 47 YALE L. J. 194, 197-98 (1937).
30. The first edition of Moore is quoted on admissibility being placed on sole basis

of relevancy and materiality in United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp.
751, 754 (D. Del. 1943), but the objection made to the evidence at the trial was "immaterial and irrelevant." The same quotation is given in Neff v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
7 F.R.D. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1948), but the receipt of the evidence was held justified
entirely aside from any consideration of Rule 43 (a).
31. Note 15 supra.
32. Reck v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 180 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Vanadium
Corporation of America v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 159 F.2d 105, 109 (2d
Cir. 1947) ; Boerner v. United States, 117 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Commercial
Banking Corporation v. Martel, 123 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1941).
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"thority.3 3 Such is the coinmon law tradition in this country.3 4 On the
whole the American cases on admissibility are anything but modern or
35
liberal.
However, as inadequate as Rule 43(a) is, it furnishes possibilities for
progressive rulings which the courts have not fully exploited. Although there
is nothing in the Rule to authorize a major break with the past on a nationwide scale, the federal tribunal can choose, from among the decisions of the
other 47 states, the better view on any point which remains undecided in the
torum-state or the federal law. The provision, rules applied in the state or
heretofore applied in federal suits in equity, should be interpreted to mean
the body of law followed in each of the two designated jurisdictions. If gaps
are left by an absence of decisions in the particular jurisdiction the federal
courts can decide for themselves what the law is. 30 Unfortunately when the
opportunity presents itself they do not take advantage of it.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America3 7 testimony of a deceased
witness at a former hearing was excluded at a later trial although it was
offered against the Aluminum Company both times. The party against whom
the former testimony was being offered had had an opportunity to crossexamine the deceased witness but the transcript was excluded because the
plaintiff, the party offering it, was not a party to the former proceeding. The
court said that a quotation of the testimony could not be received because it
would not be admissible if offered against the plaintiff; the right to introduce
must be reciprocal. A decision of the United States court of appeals for the
local circuit was cited.38 The case relied on and others do indeed support the
exclusion but the doctrine is unsound and there are authorities to the contrary.3 9 The court in the Alminum case made the exclusionary ruling on
the basis of federal law without discussing the law of the state in which the
court was held, namely, New York. The courts of New York seem not to
33. For a fuller discussion consult Green, The Admissibility of Evidence Under the
Federal Rules, 55 HARv. L. Rlv. 197, 216 (1941).
34. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19, 103 (1921).
35. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L.
REv. 909 (1937) ; Tracy, What Progress in Reform of Evidence Rides? 20 J. Am. JUD.
Soc'y 80 (1936).
36. See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 64 Sup. Ct. 1015, 88 L. Ed. 1246 (1944);
Michigan Central R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 291, 26 Sup. Ct. 459, 50 L. Ed. 744
(1906) ; HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS 120 (1940) ; cf. Peoples
Loan & Investment Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 437, 441 (8th Cir. 1945). In
Lake Shore Nat. Bank v. Bellanca Aircraft Corporation, 83 F. Supp. 795 (D. Del. 1949)
the court decided the Delaware law for itself with the result that the evidence was
excluded.
37. 1 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
38. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Gumby, 99 Fed. 192, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1900).
39. Harrell v. Quincy, 0. & K. C.R. Co., 186 S.W. 677 (Mo. 1916); Hartes v.
Charlotte Electric Ry. Co., 162 N.C. 236, 78 S.E. 164 (1913); Note, 142 A.L.R. 673,
696 (1943).
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have decided the point.40 Therefore, the United States district court could
have assumed that New York would adopt the better view, the one favoring
admissibility against a defendant who had already had an opportunity to
cross-examine the deceased witness on the same issue.
Altmayer v. Travelers Protective Association41 held that the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin erred in allowing
a showing of a statement to his physician by insured, since deceased, that he
had suffered a fall. The court of appeals cited no authority. A search for
Wisconsin cases should have divulged that the point has not been clearly setfled in the state but that at least one decision points toward treating a statement to a physician as to the external cause of an injury as an excepion to the
hearsay rule.42 The result is justified by reference to the probability that a
person seeking treatment will give the doctor truthful and accurate information. 48 The district court, which usually would be in a better position to
know the state law than the court of appeals, had allowed the statement to be
shown. Apparently the question has not been passed on at all by the state
courts in Florida, 44 but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit approved
the exclusion, by a United States district court in Florida of testimony as to
what deceased told his physician about the cause of his wound. 45 No authority was cited. Here again there was a failure to seize the opportunity to
decide that because the forum-state courts had never decided otherwise the
evidence was admissible under the state law. These two cases are, of course,
in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority.4 However, the question was not as to the majority view but as to the law of the particular state.
In many instances modernizing and liberalizing the rules of evidence can be
accomplished only by breaking with the majority.
When confronted with a case of first impression in federal evidence law
the courts have usually failed to use the spirit of Rule 43(a) to reach a
47
liberal result if forum-state law did not require it. In Palmer v. Hoffman
40. See Note, 142 A.L.R. 673, 687 (1943).

41. 119 F2d 1005 (7th Cir. 1941).
42. Kraut v. State, 228 Wis. 386, 280 N.W. 327 (1938). An earlier case contains
a dictum contra. Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N.W. 749 (1920).
The statement was unnecessary to the decision because the communications were held
privileged.
43. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 48 Ga. App. 742, 173 S.E. 471 (1934); Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37, 228 S.W. 1036 (1921) ; Omberg v. United States Mutual
Ass'n, 101 Ky. 303, 40 S.W. 909 (1897).
44. See Notes, 130 A.L.R. 977, 983 (1941), 80 A.L.R. 1527, 1529 (1932), 67 A.L.R.

10, 25 (1930).
45. Walker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 127 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1942). The
decision might be justified on the ground that the district judge was in better position
than the Circuit Court of Appeals to decide state law.
46. See Note, 130 A.L.R. 977, 983 (1941).
47. 318 U.S. 109, 63 Sup. Ct. 477, 87 L. Ed. 645 (1943). The restrictive influence
of this case is shown by England v. United States, 174 F.2d 466, 468 (5th Cir. 1949) ;
Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 175 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1949); Clainos v. United States,
163 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
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the Supreme Court had before it an action for damages arising out of a gradecrossing accident. Both the United States district court sitting in New York
and the court of appeals had held inadmissible a statement made by the
engineer of the train to an assistant superintendent of the railroad two days
after the accident. The Supreme Court approved the rulings. The written
statement was offered under the Act of Congress of June 20, 1936,48 which
seems from its language to be intended to substitute an entirely new basis of
admissibility for the "regular entries" hearsay exception. Nevertheless Mr.
Justice Douglas said that the statement was not signed in the regular course
of business within the meaning of the Act. An offer to prove that it was,
had been made but the trial judge sustained an objection to the offer. Professor Morgan comments: "It is suggested with deference, but with confidence, that Mr. Justice Douglas is taking judicial notice as true of a
proposition which is false in fact. . . It is said that James B. Thayer once
remarked in effect that the greatness of the Supreme Court was not revealed
'49
in its decisions on questions of evidence.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held testimony of one
who had examined deed indexes and had found no record of a judgment
of forfeiture, not to be the best evidence. The case came up from Kentucky
and authority from that state was cited requiring the production of the
custodian of the records. The court of appeals said, "Under the facts of the
case at bar, we follow the Kentucky case most applicable to the decision." 50
This would be the proper course if the state case favored admissibility but
the evidence should not be excluded without considerating the federal authorities. None are cited in the opinion. If there are no federal decisions
directly in point the court could have adopted as the rule in the national
tribunals the principle considered to be sound. WAigmore says that there is
no preference for one witness over another in this situation. A ruling in
favor of admissibility might have been supported by citing federal cases which
say that evidence can be admitted in the absence of federal precedents excluding, 51 that the Rules of Civil Procedure have attempted to liberalize
admissibility,52 that when in doubt the ruling should be in favor of admis48. 49 STAT. 1561 (1936), 28 U.S.C. § 695 (1936), iww 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (Supp.
1951). A statute drafted from the same model was in force in New York. Hoffman v.
Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 984 (2d Cir. 1942).
49. Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARV. L. Rzv. 481, 566 (1946).
50. Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corporation v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F2d 871,
887 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944). Contra on evidence ruling, 4
WiGmom, EviDENcE § 1272 (3d ed. 1940).
51. Peoples Loan & Investment Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 437 (8th Cir.

1945).

52. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949); Dellefield v.
Blockdel Realty Co., 128 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1942); United States v. Vehicular

Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943).
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sibility. 53 Another case cited only Pennsylvania decisions when excluding a
statement offered as res gestae.54 It would seem that some investigation
should have been made of the federal cases. If none in point were found the
general authorities could be consulted. Instead the court allowed the decision
to be controlled by the law of the state in which the court was held and
the result was exclusion. A similar failure to look into the federal decisions
occurred in connection with the refusal to receive a statement of an employee
offered as an admission. 55 Still other cases cited no authority for a debatable
application of the controversial opinion rule 56 nor for exclusion of defendants'
reputation for honesty.5 7

The latter ruling was based on the ground that the

proceeding to recover damages for presenting false claims against the United
States was not criminal.
Only one case was found which made any attempt to develop the possibilities presented by an absence of authorities in the forum state or the United
States courts. There the evidence was received on the basis of the general
weight of authority.58 The opinion did not expressly interpret Rule 43(a)
as permitting the court to decide for itself in the absence of controlling authority. However, this interpretation is given in a dictum in another case. 0
It may be significant that both of these opinions were written in the latter half
of the period which has elapsed since the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. There is an occasional indication of a tendency on the part
of the decisions to become more liberal. In 1940 and 1941 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said in three cases that an expert witness cannot
give his opinion on an ultimate question for the determination of the jury. 0
Since then the decisions of the courts of appeals have been the other way.01
They have held that such an opinion may be received or that admissibility
53. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Neff v. Pennsyl-

vania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1948).

54. Gaynor v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, 86 F. Supp. 284, 290 (E.D. Pa.
1949), rev'd, 183 F.2d 482 (3d Cir. 1950).
55. Trouser Corporation of America v. Goodman & Theise, Inc., 153 F.2d 284 (3d
Cir. 1946).
56. Crow v. Continental Oil Co., 115 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1940).
57. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 41 F. Supp. 197 (W.D. Pa. 1941), rcev'd,
127 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1942), rev'd, 317 U.S. 537, 63 Sup. Ct. 379, 87 L. Ed. 443 (1943).
The result seems to be unsound. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Treadwell, 79
F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1935); Waggoman v. Fort Worth Well Machinery & Supply Co.,
124 Tex. 325, 76 S.W.2d 1005 (1934).
58. Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947).
59. Peoples Loan & Investment Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 F.2d 437 (8th Cir.
1945).
60. Farris v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 116 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Continental
Casualty Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Temple, 116 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1941) ; United States
v. Ware, 110 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1940) ; cf. Hamilton v. United States, 73 F.2d 357, 358
(5th Cir. 1934).
61. Builders Steel Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Revenue, 179 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1950);
Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 162 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 445 (1948);
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Francis, 148 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1945).
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depends on the nature and circumstances of the case. However these decisions are not from the Fifth Circuit and do not make use of the language of
Rule 43(a). The cases from the Fifth as well as the other circuits rely
on federal precedents. 62
WHERE BOTH FEDERAL AND FORUm-STATE PRECEDENTS EXCLUDE

Failure of the federal courts to decide for themselves the evidence law
of the forum-state or of the United States courts when the question presented
has not been decided in one or both of the two jurisdictions is rather clearly
unsound. There is another device by which liberal and progressive rulings
could sometimes be made by determining the general weight of authority
or the better view among precedents from other jurisdictions. It is more debatable than the solution suggested for the situation where either forum-state
or federal precedents are lacking. An early district court opinion said: "Rule
43 does not deal with the law as to what testimony should be excluded. It
deals only with what is admissible under the law of the United States or
the law of the State in which the particular court sits. It is intended to
liberalize admissibility of testimony, but has nothing to do with what should be
03
excluded."
Neither the judge who wrote the opinion nor the commentators' who
quote him have carried the idea to its logical conclusion. Such conclusion
would be that so far as the language of the Rule is concerned evidence need
not be excluded just because the three sources mentioned in the Rule would
exclude it. This result is reached by the following reasoning: If the logical
inference from the language of the Rule is that only such data, shall be admitted as are admissible under the law of one of the three designated sources,
nevertheless other matter may be admitted. The Rule says what must be
received, but other things may be. When a particular item is inadmissible
according to all three sources mentioned, how should the district court's ruling
be determined in view of the silence of Rule 43 (a) ? One of the designated
sources is the statutes of the United States 64 and by hypothesis one of such
statutes excludes the evidence. We are assuming that all three sources exclude the particular evidence; here the statute is not in conflict with the Rules,
62. Some of these cases cite state decisions in addition to the federal cases.
63. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 4 D.J. Bull. 18, 1 Fed. Rules
Serv. 43a.-3, Case No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), quoted in HOLTZOFF; NEw FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE CouRTs 120 (1940), and in 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1319 n.3 (2d
ed. 1951).
64. If either one of the other two sources would admit, the statute must be disregarded becaus in this situation it is in conflict with the Rules of Civil Procedure and to
that extent is repealed. See note 65 in!fra. This is clearly the correct conclusion concerning a federal statute in force when the Rules were adopted. In the case of a statute
adopted afterward the question whether the act prevails over the Rule would depend
upon the power of Congress and the intent of Congress.
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is not repealed, 65 and controls. The evidence must be excluded because the
act of Congress says so. At this point a distinction should be taken between
a federal statute such as the Communications Act which is interpreted as
forbidding the receipt, in a trial in a United States district court, of information obtained by the Government by wiretapping, 0 and a statute like the Federal Business Records Act which says that certain memoranda and records
shall be received and considered in the trial if they meet the requirements of
the statute. 67 The former type fixes the canon to be followed except when the
statute is in conflict with Rule 43 (a)-e.g., when the forum-state law would
admit the material. On the other hand when a federal statute merely requires
receipt of the data if prerequisites are met and the requirements are not satisfied by the offered evidence, it is not clear that the evidence must be excluded
even when the other two sources would exclude.
When the applicable federal statute is of the latter type or there is no
federal statute dealing with the subject matter but the federal decisions and
the law of the state where the district court is held, exclude, the court may
decide in favor of admissibility nevertheless, if justification can be found in
principles of law as interpreted by courts in any common law jurisdiction.
By specifying in the alternative what is required to be received, Rule 43 (a)
may imply that the court is not required to receive evidence falling outside
the specified categories.68 However, the Rule does not prohibit the receipt
of such evidence.60 Assuming further that no act of Congress prohibits
receipt of the evidence, where are we to look for the law determining admissibility or inadmissibility? The last sentence of Federal Civil Procedure Rule
83 is as follows: "In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." The
provision appears to give the district court absolute discretion over "practice"
not covered by the Rules or local rules of court and to exempt the exercise
of the discretion from any appellate review. Practice is sometimes given a
meaning narrower than that of procedure and is then interpreted as not including evidence.70 But practice and procedure apparently are used as
65. Sec. 1 of the Act of June 19, 1934, c.651, 48 STAT. 1064, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2072 (Supp. 1951), "says that the rules which the Supreme Court is authorized to prescribe for the district courts shall take effect as provided therein "and thereafter all laws
in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect." The Rules of Civil Procedure
were issued under Section 2 but the two sections should be construed together. 2 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACE 9 (2d ed. 1948).
66. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1951); Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275, 82 L. Ed. 314 (1937).
67. STAT. 945 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (Supp. 1951).
68. The words in the third sentence "In any case, the statute or rule" appear tc,
mean the statutes or rules to which reference is made in the second sentence.

69. Note 63 supra.
70. See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 231, 2 Sup. Ct. 443, 27 L. Ed. 506 (1882).
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synonyms at times."1 Even if the contrast between the use of one term in
Rule 1 and the other in Rule 83 is not sufficient to establish the narrower
meaning for practice in the latter Rule, the present writer does not believe that
Rule 83 applies in any broad fashion to evidence. It probably was intended
to take care of minor procedural problems and anything overlooked by the
Rules of Civil Procedure. 72 Furthermore, although Rule 43(a) does not
specifically provide for the situation where forum-state and federal law both
exclude, it does indicate a general attitude of liberal admissibility."
State law which would exclude the testimony need not be followed because Rule 43(a) does not require it, the Conformity Act is repealed, 4 and
the Rules of Decision Act seems to be supplanted insofar as it had been
interpreted as prescribing conformity to state rules of evidence."5 There
remains for consideration the exclusionary federal decisions. Are they to be
followed when the forum-state law is in accord with them? As stated in the
preceding paragraphs the answer on principle is, not necessarily. In the
absence of any other requirement the district judges should look to the rules
of evidence applied in the United States courts, but these rules may change
through evolution. The Supreme Court has said that "a rule of evidence at
one time thought necessary to the ascertainment of truth should yield to the
experience of a succeeding generation whenever that experience has clearly
demonstrated the fallacy or unwisdom of the old rule. .

.

. It has been said

so often as to have become axiomatic that the common law is not immutable
but flexible, and by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions." 8
It would seem obvious that such changes receive recognition by a minority of
jurisdictions before they attain the support of the majority. And so we are
led to the conclusion that where the federal decisions and forum-state law
would exclude but no act of Congress requires exclusion or admission, the
federal courts should follow the soundest doctrine found in any AngloAmerican jurisdiction.
No cases adopting this view were found."7 A United States district
court in Pennsylvania held a memorandum made at the time of the occurrence
360, 98 N.E. 666 (1912); see Poyser v. Minors,
71. Chicago v. Williams, 254 Ill.
7 Q.B.D. 329, 333 (1881).
72. See Clark and Tolman, inPROCEEDINGS OF WASHINGTON INSTITUTE AND NEv
YomK SYmPosIux 71, 128, 129 (1938); HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE
COURTS 163, 164 (1940).
73. The Rules attempt to liberalize admissibility. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co.
176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949); Dellefield v. Blockdel Realty Co., 128 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.

1942).

74. By Act of June 25, 1948, c.646, § 39, 62 STAT. 992, 28 U.S.C.A. § 39 (1949).
75. I WIG-MORE, EVIDENCE 199 (3d ed. 1940).
76. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 369 (1933),
a criminal case decided before the passage of the acts enabling the Supreme Court to
pass the civil and criminal procedural rules.
77, Cf. cases in note 30 mtPra.
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was inadmissible because the witness identifying and vouching for the memorandum was not shown to lack a present recollection of the facts recorded. 78
Pennsylvania and federal cases were cited in support of the ruling. However,
the weight of authority and probably the better view is conlra.79 In another
case the inadmissibility of a statement as to the cause of an injury, made to
a physician apparently for treatment, was asserted on the basis of federal and
forum-state authorities.80 If those decisions are not binding, strong authority
is available for the opposite view.81 In a third case, Wright ,v.Wilson,"2
testimony by the plaintiff was not allowed in an action for damages for an
injury resulting from being struck by an automobile. The defendant, driver
of the car, had died before trial: The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
approved the ruling "without enthusiasm," saying: "The rule excluding a
survivor's testimony seems to stand in the almost unique situation of being
condemned by all of the modern writers on the law of evidence."8 3 In this
case and the case from Pennsylvania the opinions clearly imply that if tiere
is no federal statute in force and the other two sources stated in Rule 43 (a)
exclude, the evidence must be excluded. Instead of thinking positively the
courtg ,drew' a negative inference not required by the language of the Rule.
The case involving the hearsay statement concerning the cause of the injury
did not cite Rule 43 (a).
Subdivision (a) has contributed to the development of the liberal attitude toward admissibility expressed in some opinions 4 but there are very
few, if any, reported cases in which Rule 43(a) led to a ruling different from
what it would have been in the absence of the Rule.8 5 Obviously we should
78. In re Messenger, 32 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
79. Note, 25 COL. L. REv. 498 (1925).
80. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Carter, 110 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1940).
A similar case, Krug v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 120 F.2d 296 (8th
Cir. 1941).
81. Note 43 supra.
82. 154 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1946).
83. Id. at 620.
84. For example Reck v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 180 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950);
Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Vanadium Corp. of America
v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 159 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1947); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Seighman, 140 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1944); Commercial Banking Corp. v. Martel, 123
F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1941).
85. The present writer is unable to cite any cases which he considers clear examples.
In Peoples Gas Co. of Kentucky v. Fitzgerald, 188 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1951) and Slattery
v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, syl. 10 (2d Cir. 1951) it does -not appear that federal
doctrine is any different from forum-state law nor that any jurisdiction would reach any
different result. Notes, 46 CoL. L. REv. 267, 275 n.53 (1946), and 34 CORN. L.Q. 23g, 244,
n.43 (1948) cite three cases said to be examples of reversal of the historical position of
the respective circuits. Two of these are discussed in the text of the present article. The
third is Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo, 106 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1939). The Columbia
Law Review Note supra shows that the decisions in the eighth circuit prior to 1938 were
in conflict on the conformity question. Therefore in the absence of Rule 43(a) the case
under discussion might have been decided the same way. Meaney v. United States, 112
F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1940), gets a liberal result but cites federal authorities only and does
not mention Rule 43(a).
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not place in this latter class opinions which cite both federal and forum-state
authority, nor those which admit the evidence by conforming to the law of the
state but would have done the same before the adoption of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, nor those which cite only federal decisions but did not
follow the conformity principle before. Practically all the decisions of the
federal courts since the adoption of the Rules fall into those three categories.8 6
For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California permitted a view of the premises to be treated as evidence on
authority of California decisions.s 7 California is in the Ninth Circuit, whose
court of appeals before 1938 required conformity, in evidence rulings, to the
decisions of the state where the district court was sitting.8 8
Judge Clark, reporter for the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee, has
cited three case& as showing how- well subdivision (a) has served "to set the
federal trend toward generous admissibility." s 9 However all three are decisions of judge Clark's own circuit (the Second) ; all three cite federal cases
to support admissibility; and the Second Circuit did not previously conform
tostate evidence decisions anyway. 90 The results could have been the same
in all three cases if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not been
adopted. Other opinons which at first glance appear to show the influence
of Rule 43(a) yield to a similar analysis. In 1945 the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Fakouri v. Cadais9' applied two Louisiana statutes on the
authentication of foreign documents. Before 1938 the doctrine of the Fifth
Circuit had been that there was no hard and fast rule requiring federal courts
to follow or not to follow the decisions of the state where the trial is held. 92
Furthermore, even circuits which did not feel bound to follow state decisions,
apparently were bound by state statutes on evidence. 93 The same analysis
can be made of other recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit. In two such'
cases9 4 it is pertinent to note in addition that the opinions do not indicate
the existence of a different federal doctrine and seemingly any court would
have reached the same result. According to dicta in the Third Circuit, the
district courts were governed before 1938 by forum-state rules of evidence
86. Note, 46 COL. L. REv. 267, 274 (1946).
87. In re C & P Co., 63 F. Supp. 400 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
88. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Smith & Smith, Inc., 58 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.

1932).

89. Reck v. Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 180 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1950).
90. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934 (2d
Cir. 1927).
91. 147 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1945).
92. Royal Ins. Co. v. Eastham, 71 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1934).
93. Pariso v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 1930); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
Co. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1927).
94. Lewis v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 183 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1950);
Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947).
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only when there was no federal rule to the contrary. 95 Consequently, a district court in New Jersey (in the Third Circuit) which admitted evidence 0
on the authority of a United States Supreme Court case could have made the
same ruling before 1938.
Rule 43 (a), as interpreted by the courts, can bring about a liberalization
of evidence law at best only in those instances in which federal law is liberal
or in those instances and locations where the local state law is liberal. Actually
there is no concrete evidence of any effect on the decisions of the United
97
States courts as distinguished from their opinions.

COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES

The fourth and last sentence of the Rule is: "The competency of a
witness to testify shall be determined in like manner." In other words the
legal capacity of a witness is to be determined in the same manner as the
admissibility of evidence-by reference to the three sources and by following
the most liberal precept. An attempt to apply the provision leads to the
discovery that a 1906 act of Congress required the competency of a witness
in a civil action, suit or proceeding to be determined by the laws of the
state in which the court was held.98 From 1864 to 1906, the acts of Congress
made conformity subject to exceptions. Neither color, nor interest, nor being
a party to the suit could render a witness incompetent in the courts of the
United States. The exception was subject to an exception in the form of
a survivor's or deadman's statute. 99 Thus for almost half a century competency as affected by interest or survivorship was controlled both at law and
in equity' 00 by federal statutes and decisions. Do these constitute the rules
of evidence "heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the
hearing of suits in equity" or does the word, "heretofore," point to the state
of things just before the adoption of the Rules, i.e., from 1906 to 1938? One
95. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. White, 8 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1925); Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Ammann, 296 Fed. 453 (3d Cir. 1924).
96. Franzen v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 51 F. Supp. 578 (D.N.J. 1943).
97. The legal situations in the cases cited in Note, 30 Tzx L. REv. 350, 353 n.21
(1952) are similar to those in the cases discussed above.

98. Act of June 29, 1906, c.3608, 34

STAT.

618, 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 (1928).

99. "In the courts of the United States no witness shall be excluded in any action on
account of color, or in any civil action because he is a party to or interested in the
issue tried: Provided,That in actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment may be rendered for or against them, neither party shall be
allowed to testify against the other, as to any transaction with, or statement by, the
testator, intestate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party, or
required to testify thereto by the court. In all other respects, the laws of the State
in which the court is held shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses
in the courts of the United States in trials at common law, and in equity and admiralty."
REV. STAT. § 858 (1878).
100. Ray. STAT. § 858 applied to suits in equity as well as to actions at law. Rowland
v. Biesecker, 181 Fed. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
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authority seems to assume that the reference is to the situation immediately
prior to 1938.101 This would result in conformity to the law of the state
and has the advantage of simplicity. The number of sources of law to be
considered is reduced from three to one unless and until Congress enters the
field by passing statutes. Also the former canons of competency in the
United States district courts in a given state remain unchanged; the lawyers
need not become familiar with a new practice.
However, there is little logic in the result. The Supreme Court evidently
intended to give the proponent of proof three springs from which to drink
but the interpretation under discussion dries up one of them by concluding
that the rules of competency heretofore applied in the United States courts
were simply the rules in force in the forum-state. That conclusion is not
entirely true of the period prior to 1906. Since there was a period in which
a distinctive federal law of competency as affected by interest or survivorship
existed it seems more in line with the spirit of Rule 43(a) to make use of
the precedents of that period. Those precedents relate to the one area in
which there is much controversy about competency-the field of a survivor's
disqualification. The possible usefulness of the federal precedents grows out
of the difference in the language and interpretation of the survivors' statutes.102 The Georgia Code makes a witness incompetent to testify in a proceeding covered by the survivors' act, if he is interested in the result of the
10 3
The Supreme
suit and if as a party to the cause he would be incompetent.
Court of the United States in 1880 held the federal disqualification inappli04
If
cable to those who, not being parties, have an interest in the result.
the district courts sitting in Georgia would treat the United States Supreme
Court decision and the statute which it applies as precedents heretofore applied on hearings in equity, they could allow the interested witness to testify
despite the contrary Georgia law. The first sentence of the 1878 federal
statute,

"...

no witness shall be excluded ...

the issues tried," would be applicable.

because he is ...

interested in

105

In a 1949 decision, a district court excluded the testimony of the officers
of the corporate defendant as to conversations and transactions with the
The court interpreted the state statute
testator of the plaintiff-executor.-0
as disqualifying the officers, and applied what it conceived to be the forumFEDERAL PRACTICE 1330 (2d ed. 1951).
102. Note, 31 ILL. L. REv. 218, 222 (1936).
103. GA. CODE § 38-1603(4) (1933).
104. Potter v. National Bank, 102 U.S. 163, 26 L. Ed. 111 (1880) ; accord, McMullen
v. Ritchie, 64 Fed. 253 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1894) ; Stephens v. Bernays, 42 Fed. 488 (E.D.

101. 5 MOORE,

Mo. 1890).

105. Note 99 supra.

106. Lake Shore Nat. Bank v. Bellancia Aircraft Corp., 83 F. Supp. 795 (D. Del.

1949).
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state law because there is no pertinent United States statute and the court
said that there is no rule of evidence, heretofore applied in equity and relating
to competency of witnesses, to which attention nmst be given. The opinion
is not clear as to whether no attention is given to the Act of 1878 because it
was superseded by the Act of 1906 or because the 1878 Act applied to actions
at law as well as in equity. Neither reason is satisfactory. Rule 43(a) does
not say that the rule applied in equity must have been in force at the time
Rule 43(a) took effect. The Rule on the contrary indicates an intention to
make available whatever equity canon would admit, in spite of an exclusionary
state law. The second reason is no more adequate. A law is none the less
applicable in equity simply because it also applies at law. The court's interpretation of the state statute is very dubious' 07 but if right as to the state
law the court could still have considered the federal law heretofore applied in
equity. It seems that the officers could have testified under the 1878 federal
statute. 108
Wright v. Wilson' 0 9 rests on firmer ground. There the court assumes
that the state survivors' statute would control only if the federal law heretofore applied would not admit. After testing the admissibility of the evidence
by the common law, the forum-state law, and the federal statutes, including
the 1878 Act, the result was stated as follows: "The inevitable conclusion is
that whatever door one tries it is firmly locked against the admissibility of
the proffered testimony in this case.""10 One door which the court ignored
was the precedent of the six states which, as brought out in the opinion, allow
all parties including survivors to testify. The court adopted the prevailing
attitude towards Rule 43(a) by assuming that if there is no pertinent
federal statute which is in force at the present time and if the other two designated sources exclude, the evidence must be excluded. The opinion starts on
a very liberal note by speaking of 43(a) as "a rule of admissibility not exclusion.""' However, the statement is not followed to its logical conclusion.
There was another part of the law of competency concerning which the
federal courts followed their own precedents, in this instance even after 1906.
In 1915, in McDonald v. Pless, 1 2 the Supreme Court decided that a juror
was incompetent to impeach his own verdict but said that the decision must
be made without regard to the law in North Carolina where the federal trial
court was held. In 1947 the United States Court for the District of Maryland received testimony of a juror concerning an occurrence in the jury room.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See Cush v. Allen, 13 F.2d 299, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
Id.at 300.
154 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1946).
Id.at 619.
Id.at 617.
238 U.S. 264, 35 Sup. Ct. 783, 59 L. Ed. 1300 (1915).
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In his published opinion the district judge indicates that Rule 43(a) does
not require an adherence to Maryland law on this question. However, it
appears from the opinion that the Maryland and the United States decisions
reach the same result on the question before the court. 113

ScoPr or RULE 43(A)
Obviously there are some limitations on the scope of the Rule which
are not set forth in its language. The Constitution of the United States
1 4
provides for the privilege against self-incrimination in the federal courts. 1
The abolition or restriction of the privilege by a state would have no effect
upon the practice of the United States district courts sitting in the state." 5
The rule excluding evidence obtained by federal officers through an illegal
search and seizure is also sanctioned by the Constitution. In United States
v. Wallace & Tiern an Co.,'" the Supreme Court said, "That rule stems from
the Fourth Amendment." The rule applies to evidence offered in a civil case,
if illegally obtained by the Government." 7 There are other Constitutional
provisions which restrict the scope of Rule 43(a).""
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot change substantive
rights."" Doctrines placing and regulating the burden of proof are usually
treated as a part of the law of evidence. They are not controlled by Rule
43(a), however, because they are substantive; and, therefore, the law of the
forum state will apply when state-given rights are involved. 20 The so-called
parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence but one of substantive law.' 2 1
Questions of sufficiency and relevancy often depend upon substantive law
and in such instances would not be subject to Rule 43(a). 122 Whether other
doctrines will be held to be artifices which substantially affect the outcome
of the case 2 3 or mere procedural devices, remains to be seen.
113. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Imbraguglia, 73 F. Supp. 909, 919 (D. Md.
1947). Consult also United States v. 120,000 Acres of Land, 52 F. Supp. 212 (N.D.
Tex. 1943).
114. U.S. CONST.

AMEND. V.

115. Rule 43(a) cannot alter a rule of evidence sanctioned by the Constitution. See
1 WIGMORE, EvIDEc § 7 (3d ed. 1940).
116. 336 U.S. 793, 798, 69 Sup. Ct. 824, 93 L. Ed. 1042 (1949).
117. Chow Fook Hong v. Ward, 24 F. Supp. 776 (D. Mass. 1938).
118. 1 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE § 7 (3d ed. 1940).
119. 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (Supp. .1951).
120. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 60 Sup. Ct. 201, 84 L. Ed.
196 (1939).
121. Wootton Hotel Corp. v. Northern Assur. Co., 155 F.2d 988 (3d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 758 (1946) ; American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Nicholas, 124 F.2d
477 (10th Cir. 1941).
122. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 858 (1949).
123. Under test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89
L. Ed. 2079 (1945) ; cf. Franzen v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 51 F. Supp. 578,
584 (D.N.J. 1943).
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Before 1938 the federal courts had their own rule as to the scope of
cross-examination. It was in force even in those circuits which followed the
conformity principle. The Supreme Court's Advisory Committee reconmended a change from the strict federal rule to the liberal rule of the orthodox
common law. The Supreme Court rejected the recommendation. Due to
this history of Rule 43 it has been held that the federal courts must still
apply their earlier rule limiting cross-examination more or less to questions
seeking to impeach or to make the witness retract or contradict something
24
testified to during direct examination.1
Rules 1 and 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deal with scope
and applicability of the Rules in general. They should be consulted on the
coverage of Rule 43(a).'5 The latter applies to bankruptcy 126 but not to
proceedings in admiralty. 1 27 Coming now to the language of subdivision (a)
itself, we find that in addition to form of testimony and competency of witnesses it deals with admissibility of evidence. Dean Wigmore doubted whether
privilege and judicial notice were matters of admissible evidence. 12s Professor
'Ioore thinks both are covered by Rule 43(a) .1 29 The cases give support
to his view concerning judicial notice 130 but do not cite Rule 43 when dealing
with privilege. No attempt to apply the Rule to presumptions has come to
1 1
light.
CONCLUSION

The scope of Rule 43 (a) cannot be determined solely from its language
and from the provisions of other subdivisions and Rules. Its relation to the
Constitution and the Erie doctrine must be considered also. On the face of
the Rule the provision as to competency of witnesses appears to be the same
as for admissibility of evidence, but the application of the language is conIplicated by the existence of statutes which prior to 1938 required conformity
to state law in many matters of competency in equity as well as at law.
Rule 43 (a) directs the United States district courts to admit all evidence
which is admissible under any one or more of the following (1) United States
124. Moyer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 126 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1942).
125. Of course Rule 43(a) does not apply to criminal proceedings. Compare FED. R.
CRInr. P. 26.
126. GEN. ORDER IN BANKRUPTCY 37, 11 U.S.C.A., following § 53 (1943).
127. FED. R. Civ. P., 81(a) (1).
128. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE 201 (3d ed. 1940).
129. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACriCE 1332, 1340 (2d ed. 1951).
130. Hagen v. Porter, 156 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 729
(1946) ; Green, Evidence of Unfair Labor. Practices undcr the Taft-Hartley Act, 26
N.C.L. REv. 253, 266 (1948).
131. Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986, 993 n.30 (5th Cir. 1942) merely raised
the question without answering it. For a collection of some of the cases dealing with
presumptions during 1939-1940, see Green, The Admissibility of Evidence under the
Federal Rules, 55 -IARV. L. REv. 197, 208 (1941).
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RULE 43 (a)

statutes, (2) the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the
132
statutes,
United States on the hearing of suits in equity, (3) the decisions,
or rules of court applying to courts of general jurisdiction of the state in
which the district court is held. In making use of precedents under (2) the
courts have not limited themselves to decisions in suits seeking equitable relief but have cited cases growing out of actions at law also. If all three
sources of authority require the evidence to be excluded, the first, the statute
of the United States, is not repealed and governs; the evidence must be
excluded. If (2) or (3) furnishes clear authority for admitting the evidence it
must be admitted; any prior statute of the United States which would exclude
in this situation is inconsistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure and is repealed. Of course, if a statute of the United States makes the evidence
admissible, it is to be received. When no act of Congress requires exclusion
but both (2) and (3) do point toward exclusion the courts assume they must
exclude. Their interpretation is rather superficial. Rule 43(a) does not
say that evidence, which is not admissible under those sources, must be excluded. Since no definite guide for this situation is given in the Rules, it
seems that the common law should govern, but not necessarily the prior federal decisions. The Supreme Court has recognized that the decisional law of
evidence must change with the times. The federal court should follow the
best view found in Anglo-American authority.
Not only are the courts apparently unwilling to use other authorities to
admit the testimony when both federal and forum-state decisions would exclude it, but when the question of admissibility has not been decided by two
of the sources designated in Rule 43 (a) and there are exclusionary precedents
in the federal decisions or the state law, the courts frequently fail to treat the
case as one of first impression. They exclude the evidence instead of looking
for liberal precedents in other jurisdictions to fill the gap in the local or federal
decisions as the case may be.
Although the district courts and courts of appeals 3' have mentioned the
liberal tone of Rule 43(a), it is difficult to find a case in which they have
held evidence admissible by reversing their stand on conformity or nonconformity to state law. They seem to apply the same precedents they would
have followed before the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This
result should have been anticipated. In the field of evidence judges always
have been either indifferent to reform or timid about putting progressive
ideas to work.13 4 Only clear and positive language in statutes or rules of
132. Rule 81(e) does not apply because Rule 43(a) deals with state "rules of
evidence" not state "law."
133. Rule 43(a) seldom has been mentioned in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
134. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 243, 253 (3d ed. 1940).
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court will materially change the law of evidence.13 5 Subdivision (a) of Rule
43, if justified at all, is acceptable only as a temporary expedient. The
Advisory Commitee to the Supreme Court should begin to consider amendments designed to give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a position of
leadership in relation to evidence similar to the place they hold in pleading
and trial practice. Aid can probably be derived from the Model Code of
Evidence prepared by the American Law Institute, the Uniform Rules of
Evidence being drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and
the proposed Missouri Evidence Code. 30 It is time to heed the admonition
of Mr. William D. Mitchell:
"There was a tremendous pressure brought on the Advisory Committee by those
familiar with the subject of evidence insisting that there was a need for reform, which
we did not meet, and some day, sonic other advisory cbmmittee should tackle the
task of revising the rules of evidence and composing them into a new set of rules to be
promulgated by the Supreme Court.'" t
135. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A.J. 507, 581 (1938)
Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forwardat Evidence, 50 HARv. L. RaV. 909,
923, 924, 933 (1937).
136. Falknor, Evidence in 1949 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 975, 977
(N.Y.U. 1950); HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 17, 100 (1950).
137. PROCEEDINGS OF CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 186 (1938) ; accord,
5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1316, 1317 (2d ed. 1951).

